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THE CULTURAL DEFENSE AND ITS 




Child abuse and neglect are not recent developments in human 
history, nor are they unique to anyone culture.! For example, the Bible 
is filled with well-known and commonly cited aphorisms that demon-
strate the approval of severe physical punishment of children.2 One of 
the most blatant examples is in the book of Deuteronomy where Moses 
told the Israelites: 
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not 
obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and 
that, when they have chastened him, will not hearken unto 
them: Then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, 
and bring him out unto the elders of the city, and unto the 
gate of his place; And they shall say unto the elders of his city, 
This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our 
voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard. And all the men of his 
city shall stone him with stones, that he die, so shalt thou put 
evil away from among you; and all Israel shall hear, and fear. 3 
Records from Greek and Roman times describe numerous instances 
of child beating.4 Roman law, for instance, gave a father life and 
death power over his minor children based on the principle of 
patria potestas: he who gave life also had the power to take it away.5 
In England as late as the Seventh Century, a father could sell a son 
into slavery in the case of necessity.6 And during the Seventeenth 
* Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 See Marjorie R. Freiman, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse 
Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 243,243 (1982). 
2 See PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD 48-49 (1991). 
3Id. at 49 (quoting Deuteronomy 21:18-21). 
4 See Freiman, supra note 1, at 243. 
5 See Shippen L. Page, The Law, the Lawyer; and Medical Aspects of Child Abuse, in CHILD 
ABUSE 105, 106 (Eli H. Newberger ed., 1982). 
6 See id. at 106. 
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Century in Massachusetts and Connecticut, the parents of a "rebel-
lious child" could legally put their son or daughter to death.7 It is 
clear that throughout human history, the condition of children has 
been perilous. 
Compared to history of child abuse and neglect, the argument for 
the recognition of a formal "cultural defense" is a relatively recent 
development. 8 The cultural defense is an affirmative defense asserted 
by a defendant socialized in a foreign culture in accordance with social 
and legal values that differ from the culture in which he or she is 
accused of committing the particular crime.9 If such a defendant is able 
to prove that his or her actions were committed with a "reasonable, 
good faith belief in their propriety, based upon the actor's cultural 
heritage or tradition," the cultural defense would mitigate or negate 
his or her criminal responsibility.]() The rationale behind the cultural 
defense is that the moral blame-worthiness of two individuals, both 
unquestionably guilty of committing the same act, is not the same if 
one individual was socialized in a society that views the act as criminal 
and the other was socialized in a society that tolerates, or even encour-
ages, the behavior in question. ll Supporters of the cultural defense 
argue that its adoption will preserve justice for the alien offender. 12 
Opponents of the cultural defense counter with the traditional crimi-
nallaw maxim: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse."13 
This Note will explore and evaluate the viability of the cultural 
defense in the unique area of child protection law. 14 Part I addresses 
the inherent difficulty in formulating a universally acceptable defini-
7 See id. at 107. 
8 While discussed in several law review articles, American courts have been unwilling to 
recognize a formal defense based on conflicts between an immigrant defendant's native culture 
and the United States' "majority culture." See Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 
HARV. L. REv. 1293, 1293-94 (1986) [hereinafter The Cultural Defensel. 
9 See John Lyman, Cultural Defense: Viable Doctrine or Wishful Thinking?, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 87, 
88 (1986). 
10 See id. 
11 See generally Alison Dundes Renteln, A justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 
2 REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437, 438-45 (1993). 
12 See generally The Cultural Defense, supra note 8. 
13 See Taryn F. Goldstein, Culture Conflicts in Court: Should the American Criminal justice 
System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense?", 99 DICK. L. REv. 141, 158 (1994). 
14 In other words, this Note will address the issue of whether a person charged with child 
abuse or neglect in the United States may argue that since his or her actions are not illegal, but 
rather are condoned in the culture that he or she was raised, he or she is less morally culpable 
than a similar defendant socialized in the United States, and therefore, his or her charge or 
punishment should be mitigated to the extent that justice requires. 
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tion of child abuse and neglect, and is divided into three sections: the 
scholarly debate, statutory definitions of child abuse and neglect, and 
the lack of cultural considerations in these definitions. Part II examines 
and assesses the notion of a formally recognized cultural defense in 
criminal law generally and ultimately advocates its adoption. Part II is 
also broken into three sections: the philosophical justification for pun-
ishment in the criminal law, motive and intent, and culture and the 
effects of enculturation on an individual's behavior and morals. Part 
III explores the applicability of the cultural defense to the specific area 
of child protection law and concludes that, due to the expressly and 
intentionally rehabilitative nature of this area of the law, the cultural 
defense is largely irrelevant in cases of child abuse and neglect. Part 
III is divided into two sections: the first section describes the rehabili-
tative nature of child protection law generally, and the second illus-
trates this rehabilitative nature more concretely with a representative 
case, Dumpson v. Daniel M.15 
I. THE DEFINITION OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
While most people probably believe they can recognize child 
abuse and neglect when they see it, formulating an acceptable defini-
tion in the abstract has proven to be an exceedingly difficult task. In 
fact, the problem of achieving a single universally acceptable definition 
of child abuse and neglect is currently unresolved and, most likely, will 
remain this way for the indefinite future. 16 As Michael Freeman ob-
served, "Arguments surrounding definitions of child abuse reflect ideo-
logical differences and may prove intractable .... [Too] much de-
pends on who is doing the defining and for what purpose."17 
Indeed, individuals raised in western cultures may consider vari-
ous forms of punishment used by non-western parents-locking chil-
dren in huts for several days without food, smearing excrement on 
their faces in public, or forcing them to take extremely hot baths-to 
15 No official reporter has printed the opinion in Dumpson v. Daniel M. The opinion was 
printed in its entirety in The New Yom Law Journal on October 16, 1974, and was reprinted in 
full in Sanford N. Katz, Cases and Materials on Child Protection Law ch. 1, at 69 (1996) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
16 See Euncie Uzodike, Child Abuse and Neglect in Nigeria, 4 INT'L J. L. & FAM. 83, 84 (1990). 
With respect to the threshold issue of when parental actions constitute abuse or neglect and 
require state intervention, Katz wrote: "The question of when, why, and to what extent state 
intervention occurs cannot be answered in the abstract. Too many factors must be considered to 
allow a simple answer." SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 52 (1971). 
17 MICHAEL D. A. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF CHILDREN 109 (1983). 
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constitute criminal behavior. IS At the same time, however, many of our 
western child-rearing practices would be viewed as equally abusive or 
neglectful by individuals raised and socialized in other cultures.l9 For 
example, the western practices of making children wait for arbitrarily 
defined periods of time for food when they are hungry, forcing chil-
dren to sit in classrooms all day long, and ignoring infants while they 
"cry themselves out" are all behaviors that would be at odds with the 
proper child-rearing practices of many non-western cultures.2o In other 
words, many of the behaviors that seem benign, even beneficial, in the 
development of our children are viewed by other cultures as bizarre, 
exotic, and possibly damaging.21 This raises the inevitable question: 
"What is the correct definition of child abuse and neglect?" 
A. The Scholarly Debate 
With respect to the definition of child abuse and neglect, there 
are two primary areas of scholarly disagreement: one, whether to use 
broad or narrow definitions, and two, whether the definition should 
focus on the parents' behavior or on the actual harm suffered by the 
child.22 
1. Broad vs. Narrow Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect 
The primary goal of child protection legislation is to identify 
children who are currently being abused or neglected, or are in danger 
of becoming abused or neglected, and to get them into a system that 
can provide protection and assistance as quickly as possible.23 Some 
authorities argue that a broad definition of child abuse and neglect-
one which is designed to protect all children at risk-is the best way 
18 See Jill Korbin, The Cultural Context of Child Abuse and Neglect, 4 CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 3, 5 (1981). 
19 See id. 
20 See id. Korbin notes that cultural differences in child-rearing practices can lead to misin-
terpretations of neglect. See id. For example, while case workers in the United States are frequently 
alarmed when they see several children sleeping in the same bed, traditional Hawaiians would 
be just as alarmed at seeing only one child in a bed, not to mention a child living in a room of 
his or her own. See id. at 6. Similarly, the Japanese, due to the high value that they place on family 
member interdependence, believe that sharing a bed with a relative is preferable to sleeping 
alone. See id. 
21 See id. at 5-7. 
22 See Margaret H. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reparting Laws: Time far a Change, 20 FAM. L. Q. 
141,149 (1986). 
23 See id. at 149-50. 
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to accomplish this legislative goal. 24 Advocates argue that by using a 
broad definition, child protection agencies will be able to identify 
dangerous or potentially dangerous environments at the earliest signs 
of abuse, and as a result, will be better able to prevent future harm to 
children at risk through aggressive identification, intervention, and 
counseling programs. 25 
Sanford Katz, a professor of law at Boston College Law School, 
argues for broad statutes and a high level of discretion for the trial 
judges who hear the particular cases. 26 He writes: 
Statutory words such as "neglect," "cruelty," and "depravity," 
and phrases such as "unfit place" or "whose environment is 
such as to warrant the state, in the interest of the child, in 
assuming its guardianship" ... are designed to give a local 
judge, who is close to the family situation and knowledgeable 
about the community, discretion in interpretation and appli-
cation .... [T] he judge, by virtue of parens patriae, has the 
freedom and perhaps the responsibility to use his own sub-
jective views .... He evaluates the evidence; he decides its 
weight. It is his subjective response that is important. Judges, 
again by virtue of parens patriae, are supposed to be endowed 
with unique insight into the best interests of the child.27 
Katz believes that broad statutes enable judges to decide child 
maltreatment cases based on their unique circumstances, thereby 
avoiding the need to search for a specific statutorily defined behav-
ior before the state may intervene in an abusive or neglectful envi-
ronment. 28 
Since the protection and welfare of children is the ultimate goal, 
broad definitions, which lean toward the over-reporting of child abuse 
and neglect, initially seem justified. The ethical ramifications of over-
reporting, however, are significant, especially in light of the high num-
ber of abuse and neglect reports which go unsubstantiated.29 There-
fore, in an effort to protect family autonomy and individual privacy 
24 See id. at 150. 
25 See id. 
26 See KATZ, supra note 16, at 59. 
27Id. 
28 See id. at 64--65. 
29 See Douglas Besharov, ChiUi Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 315, 315 (1987). About 65% of the reported incidents of child abuse or neglect are later 
deemed "unfounded." See id. 
336 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:331 
from unwarranted state intrusion, other authorities argue for a more 
precise statutory definition of child abuse and neglect.30 Three major 
reasons underlie this view: one, the desire for and recognized value in 
a diversity of lifestyles; two, inadequate knowledge of non-traditional 
or foreign child-rearing practices by judges and social workers; and 
most importantly, the likelihood that state intervention may actually 
harm, rather than help, the child.31 Broad definitions, these authorities 
argue, lead to unfounded allegations of abuse which, even if made in 
good faith, have the effect of violating the privacy of the family, dis-
rupting intra-family relations, and unjustly stigmatizing those respon-
sible for the child's care as "child abusers."32 In arguing for narrow 
statutory definitions, Michael Wald, a professor of law at Stanford 
University, wrote: 
Vague [or broad] laws increase the likelihood that decisions 
to intervene will be made in situations where the child will 
be harmed by intervention. Because the statutes do not reflect 
a considered analysis of what types of harm justifY the risks 
of intervention, decision-making is left to the ad hoc analysis 
of social workers and judges. There is substantial evidence 
that their decisions often reflect personal values about child-
rearing, which are not supported by scientific evidence, and 
which result in removing children from environments in which 
they are doing adequately. Only through carefully drawn stat-
utes, drafted in terms of specific harms to the child, can we 
limit the possibility of intervention in situations where it will 
do more harm than good.33 
Wald argues that unless statutes allow intervention only when spe-
cific harms have been identified, social workers and judges need 
not justify, in any meaningful way, their decisions to intervene in an 
"abusive" or "neglectful" family and as a result, are more apt to 
make unsound decisions.34 Moreover, Wald argues that even if the 
particular situation requires intervention, without the identification 
30 See Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic 
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 988 (1975). 
31 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 150. A child may be subjected to investigations by state 
officials, appearances in court, medical and psychological examinations, and possible removal 
from the family while the investigation is conducted. See id. This can have negative consequences 
for the child, whether the-abuse or neglect is substantiated or not. See id. 
32 See id. 
33Wald, supra note 30, at 1001--02. 
34 See id. at 1002. 
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of specific harms by the state actors, subsequent evaluation of the 
decision to intervene will be impossible.35 
2. Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect Based on Parental 
Behavior or on Harm to the Particular Child 
In addition to the definition's scope, scholars also disagree on 
whether the definition of child abuse and neglect should focus on the 
parents' behavior or on the harm suffered by the child.36 Most statutes, 
particularly those defining neglect, focus on parental behavior and the 
environment in which the parental behavior occurs to gauge the like-
lihood offuture harm.37 David G. Gil, an authority on child abuse and 
neglect, supports these types of definitions, arguing that definitions of 
child abuse and neglect which rest on 
the observed effects of an attack on a child, such as injuries 
sustained by him, rather than in terms of the motivation and 
behavior of the attacking person . . . disregard the motiva-
tional and behavioral dynamics of perpetrators and result in 
vagueness, since the outcomes of violent, abusive acts depend 
not only on the perpetrators behavior, but also on the victim's 
reaction to the perpetrator's behavior, and on environmental 
and chance circumstances.38 
Gil therefore rejects definitions of child abuse and neglect based 
solely on the relative harm suffered by a particular child as incom-
plete formulations. 39 
Michael Wald, on the other hand, believes that the focus of the 
definition should be on the harm suffered by the child in question.40 
While acknowledging that parental behavior is relevant in determining 
whether the child is likely to suffer abuse or neglect, Wald argues that 
the speculation and the potential pitfalls of attempting to predict the 
effects of parental behavior on a specific child are problematic and can 
be avoided if the definition is based on the extent of the harm suffered 
by the child.4l In other words, Wald's definition would recognize each 
child as a unique individual with different thresholds for maltreatment, 
35 See id. 
36 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 149. 
37 See id. at 152. 
38 DAVID G. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 5 (1970). 
39 See id. 
40 See Wald, supra note 30, at 1002--03. 
41 See id. 
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and offenders would only be guilty of abuse or neglect if their particu-
lar victim manifests statutorily defined symptoms of abuse or neglect.42 
In this way, guilt for child abuse or neglect would not depend on a case 
worker's or a judge's subjective opinion of what constitutes proper 
child-rearing practices; it would depend on the child's manifestation 
of legislatively defined symptoms.43 Wald wrote: 
[A]ll available evidence indicates that it is extremely difficult 
to correlate parental behavior or home conditions with spe-
cific harms to a child, especially if the predicted harm in-
volves long-term, rather than immediate, effects of the envi-
ronment. Even in very "bad" homes, the impact of the home 
environment will vary depending upon the age of a child, the 
nature of the family interactions, developmental differences 
among children, and many other factors .... [S]ince each 
child may respond differently to a given home environment, 
the law must focus primarily on the child rather than the 
parent or the home environment.44 
Such a definition, Wald argues, will prevent unnecessary and poten-
tially harmful state intrusions into the domestic realm.45 
B. Statutory Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect 
Considering the extent of scholarly debate and its lack of consen-
sus, it is not surprising that the statutory definition of child abuse and 
neglect varies from state to state.46 For example, the state of Alaska 
relies on a relatively general definition of child abuse and neglect: 
[T]he physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, 
sexual exploitation, or maltreatment of a child under the age 
of 18 by a person under circumstances that indicate that the 
child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby,17 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 1002. 
46 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 143. Meriwether notes that while definitions vary, each 
state's statute essentially contains the same components: "(1) definition of reportable conditions, 
(2) persons required to report, (3) degree of certainty reporters must reach, (4) sanctions for 
failure to report, (5) immunity for good faith reports, (6) abrogation of certain communication 
privileges, [and] (7) delineation of reporting procedures." Id. 
47 ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(2) (Michie 1995). 
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Colorado's statute, on the other hand, sets forth more specific 
categories constituting abuse or neglect. It states: 
Any case in which a child exhibits evidence of skin bruising, 
bleeding, malnutrition, failure to thrive, burns, fracture of 
any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, or death 
and either: Such condition or death is not justifiably ex-
plained; the history given concerning such condition is at 
variance with the degree or type of such condition or death; 
or the circumstances indicate that such condition may not be 
the product of an accidental occurrence; 
Any case in which a child is subjected to sexual assault or 
molestation, sexual exploitation, or prostitution; 
Any case in which a child is a child in need of services because 
the child's parents, legal guardian, or custodian fails to take the 
same actions to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medi-
cal care, or supervision that a prudent parent would take.48 
The statutory definitions of child abuse and neglect in California 
are even more categorized.49 Here the general definition is broken 
down into eight subsections, each of which is then defined. 50 The 
subsections are sexual abuse;51 neglect,52 severe neglect,53 and gen-
eral neglect;54 willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of a child 
(including mental suffering) ;55 unlawful corporal punishment or 
injury;56 abuse in out-of-home care;57 and child abuse.58 
When these statutory definitions are compared, three significant 
differences become apparent. First, while physical abuse, neglect, and 
sexual abuse are always included in the statute, emotional abuse is not, 
despite the general recognition that children who are emotionally 
abused or neglected can suffer both severe psychological and physical 
damage.59 One reason for the statutory absence of emotional abuse 
48 COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-303(1) (a)(I-III) (1995). 
49 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1-11165.6 (West 1995). 
50 See id. 
51 See id. § 11165.1. 
52 See id. § 11165.2. 
53 See id. § 11165.2(a). 
54 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2(b) (West 1995). 
55 See id. § 11165.3. 
56 See id. § 11165.4. 
57 See id. § 11165.5. 
58 See id. § 11165.6. 
59 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.3 (West 1995) and ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(2) 
(Michie 1995) with COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-303(1) (a) (I-III) (1995). 
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may be based on its elusive and intangible nature.5O When emotional 
or mental abuse is included in a statute, it is often left undefined or it 
is based on vague standards such as the infliction of "unjustifiable ... 
mental suffering"51 or a "substantial impairment in the intellectual or 
psychological ability of a child. "62 Some authorities argue that these 
vague standards result in a high level of judicial discretion in private 
family affairs and a corresponding decrease in parental autonomy and 
rights.53 Thus, these authorities advocate a definition of emotional 
abuse or neglect which requires the manifestation of overt symptoms 
in the alleged victims.54 Unlike physical abuse, however, the harmful 
effects of emotional abuse may not manifest themselves immediately 
after the abuse occurs.65 Therefore, others argue that definitions of 
emotional abuse or neglect should focus on the parent's or caregiver's 
behavior. 56 
Second, although it is possible to specifically define physical abuse, 
the states often choose to define it in general terms, frequently as "non-
accidental physical injuries."57 A number of authorities argue against 
this definition since it requires the reporter to make the often impos-
sible determination of whether or not the child's injury was intention-
ally inflicted.68 Additionally, because corporal punishment is, by defini-
tion, a physical injury, some states have attempted to distinguish it from 
child abuse.59 For example, under the California statute, corporal pun-
60 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 160. 
61 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.3 (West 1995). 
62 IDAHO CODE § 16--1602(r) (1994). See generally Douglas Besharov. The Need to Narrow the 
Grounds for State Intervention, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 47, 47-90 (Charles C. Thomas ed., 1988). Besharov argues that the vagueness and 
over-inclusiveness of the statutory definitions of child abuse and neglect are major reasons for 
the child protection system's inability to stop preventable child maltreatment. See id. 
63 See Wald, supra note 30, at 1001-02. 
64 See id. Wald would define emotional abuse or neglect as "severe anxiety, depression or 
withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior or hostility toward others." Id. 
65 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 160. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. at 144. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (West 1995) (injuries "inflicted by other 
than accidental means"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-303(1) (a) (I) (1995): ("circumstances indicate 
that such condition may not be the product of an accidental occurrence"). 
68 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 156--57. Meriwether notes that physical injuries which 
result from a parent's inattention to his or her child's actions could arguably be deemed "acci-
dental." See id. 
69 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.4 (West 1995). Brian G. Fraser distinguishes reasonable 
and unreasonable corporal punishment based on four factors: the age of the child, the part of 
the body that was struck, the instrument used to strike the child, and the amount of damage 
inflicted. See Brian G. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, a Gaze at the Present, a Glimpse at the Future: 
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ishment is not child abuse unless it is willfully "cruel or inhuman" or 
results "in a traumatic condition. "70 
Third, since the symptoms of neglect are not as readily observable 
as those caused by physical abuse, each state has adopted one of two 
definitional standards for child neglect: the "prudent parent" standard 
or the necessity standard.71 Colorado uses the prudent parent standard, 
defining child neglect as anything less than the amount of food, cloth-
ing, shelter, medical care, and supervision that a prudent parent would 
provide for his or her child.72 While in theory most would agree that 
children should be raised by "prudent parents," the adoption of this 
standard raises two problems: one, the subjective judgments and cul-
tural biases that accompany any attempt to define the "prudent par-
ent," and two, the fact that what may appear to be child neglect is often 
the result of economic difficulties and not an absence of parental love 
or care.73 For these two reasons, many states have adopted a lesser 
standard for neglect: the necessity standard.74 Alaska, for instance, uses 
the necessity standard, defining the neglectful parent as one who fails 
to provide the minimum amounts of food, care, clothing, shelter, and 
medical attention necessary for a child.75 The fact that a parent's guilt 
or innocence may depend solely on the state that he or she commits 
the act in only increases the confusion surrounding the definition of 
child abuse and neglect. 
C. The Lack of Cultural Considerations in Definitions of Child 
Abuse and Neglect 
The issues and debates presented in the previous two sections 
illustrate the complexity and controversy involved in the formulation 
A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 641, 
652 n.62 (1979). Others argue that state intervention in the family based on parental use of 
corporal punishment should be restricted to extreme forms of physical punishment due to its 
widespread acceptance and the notion of privacy of the family. See Wald, supra note 30, at 
1008-13. 
70 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.4 (West 1995). 
71 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 157-58. 
72 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-303(1) (a) (III) (1995). 
73 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 157-58. Placing two children in the same bed may not 
be the result of neglect as much as it is the result of not being able to afford two beds due to a 
recent downturn in a guardian's financial situation. See Korbin, The Cultural Context of Child 
Abuse and Neglect, supra note 18, at 6-7. Moreover, there may be cultural reasons for placing two 
children in the same bed. See id. 
74 See Meriwether, supra note 22, at 157-58. 
75 See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(10) (Michie 1995). 
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of a workable definition of child abuse within our own country. One 
reason this issue is so emotionally charged and extremely personal is 
that the point at which child abuse is defined is also the point at which 
the state may intervene in the traditional zone of family privacy, inves-
tigate and monitor its internal workings, and mandate certain conduct 
for the future. However, there is another reason why agreeing on a 
definition of child abuse and neglect has proven so difficult: each 
individual's view of acceptable and unacceptable child-rearing prac-
tices depends, to a large extent, on the way he or she was raised and 
what was acceptable or unacceptable within his or her culture. While 
some state statutes, such as Colorado's and California's, require child 
welfare officials to take note of an individual's cultural background 
when determining whether or not abuse or neglect has occurred, other 
states, like Alaska, take no account of an individual's culture for this 
determination.76 
Despite the difficulty in establishing a universally acceptable cross-
cultural definition of child abuse and neglect, Jill E. Korbin notes that 
"virtually all cultures, regardless of how harsh or indulgent their child 
care practices appear [to other societies], have standards for accept-
able child-rearing and [sanctions for] individuals who deviate from 
those standards."77 In other words, each culture, in isolation, is reason-
ably capable of relying on its social norms and values to decide which 
parental behaviors are harmful to children and which ones are not. 78 
As different cultures come into contact with each other, however, 
conflicting cultural child-rearing practices and beliefs create a situation 
ripe with potential for disputes concerning the "correct" definition of 
child abuse and neglect.79 In order to avoid both a rigid ethnocentric 
position, where the dominant culture's beliefs and practices are pre-
sumed superior, as well as a hyper-relativist view of cultural child abuse, 
where the welfare of children is sacrificed in the name of multicultural 
sensitivity, Korbin argues that individuals must learn to view the alleged 
76 The Colorado statute requires child welfare investigators to "take into account accepted 
child rearing practices of the culture in which the child participates" as they make their deter-
minations. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-303(I)(b) (1995). The California statute states: "Cultural 
and religious child-rearing practices and beliefs which differ from general community standards 
shall not in themselves create a need for child welfare services unless the practices present a 
specific danger to the physical or emotional safety of the child." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16509 
(West 1996). 
77 Jill Korbin, What is Acceptable and Non-acceptable Child Rearing-A Cross-Cultural Consid-
eration, in CHILD ABUSE-A COMMUNITY CONCERN 257, 257 (K. Oats ed., 1982). 
78 See id. 
79 See Korbin, The Cultural Context of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 18, at 5. 
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maltreatment both from the perspective of an individual who shares 
the alleged perpetrator's cultural background, and also as a cultural 
outsider.80 Korbin writes: 
[O]ne must be cognizant of the viewpoints of members of the 
cultural group in question, termed the emie perspective, as 
well as an outsider, or the etie perspective. An understanding 
of the emie perspective has been central in anthropologist's 
efforts to organize and explain the diversity of human behav-
ior that has been documented cross-culturally. Thus, the an-
thropologist has sought to " ... grasp the native's point of 
view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world." At 
the same time, one needs an etie frame of reference such that 
behavior can be interpreted from a wider perspective. An 
understanding of both emie and etie perspectives is a necessity 
in sorting out the impact of the cultural and social context in 
which behavior, including child abuse and neglect, takes on 
meaning.81 
Therefore, if a parent accused of child abuse or neglect claims that 
the punishment he or she has inflicted on his or her child is 
acceptable under the customary child-rearing practices of his or her 
native culture, the fact-finder should, according to Korbin, utilize 
the emie perspective to determine the legitimate forms of punish-
ment within that culture.82 The fact-finder, however, must also view 
the behavior at issue from an etie perspective, keeping in mind the 
fact that cultures do not allow punishment or corrective measures 
to hinder the development or welfare of their children.83 An exam-
ple will further illustrate this process. 
When asked if a parent who intentionally scars his or her son's 
face in a ritualized ceremony should be found guilty of child abuse, 
most Americans would probably answer affirmatively. Korbin asks how 
we as a culture can decide that this parent's behavior is abusive when 
our own culture allows, and even encourages, practices like orthodon-
ture.84 When removed from their cultural contexts, both practices 
would have an etie connotation of pain inflicted on the child. However, 
80 See id. at 4. 
81Id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See Korbin, The Cultural Context of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 18, at 8. 
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viewed within their contexts, (from the emic perspective) both are 
practices that are aimed at benefiting the child by making him or her 
physically acceptable to other members of the culture.85 
Thus, Korbin argues that the cultural context of a given behavior 
"must be viewed holistically ... [s] 0 that no single element of a cultural 
pattern can be removed from its context and examined in isolation."86 
If a defendant's behavior truly cannot be interpreted or evaluated 
separately from its social context, when a genuine conflict between a 
defendant's native culture and the majority culture arises, the court 
adjudicating the case must consider evidence demonstrating the cul-
tural motivations for the defendant's actions in order to understand 
why he or she behaved in this way.87 In other words, Korbin argues the 
court must allow the defendant, in such a situation, the opportunity 
to present a cultural defense for his or her behavior. 
III. THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 
Unlike child abuse and neglect, the cultural defense is easily 
defined. A cultural defense is an affirmative defense asserted by immi-
grants, refugees, and indigenous people based on their customs or 
customary law. A successful cultural defense would permit the reduc-
tion (and possible elimination) of a charge, with a concomitant reduc-
tion in punishment.88 In order to assert the defense, the defendant 
must have been socialized in a distinctly different culture and this 
foreign culture must encourage, or at least sanction, the behavior 
which has been deemed illegal in this country.89 In other words, there 
must be a direct conflict between culturally acceptable behaviors.90 The 
rationale for the defense is that an individual's behavior is influenced 
to such a large extent by his or her culture that either the individual 
did not believe that his or her actions violated a law,91 or that the 
individual's cultural upbringing compelled him or her to act in violation 
of a known law.92 In both cases, the individual's culpability is decreased 
vis-a-vis a native citizen.93 The rationale for admitting evidence which 
furthers a cultural defense is based not only on a desire to be culturally 
85 See id. 
86Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 439. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. Renteln refers to this as the "cognitive case." See id. 
92 See id. Renteln refers to this as the "volitional case." See id. 
93 See id. 
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sensitive, although that is definitely a large part of it,94 rather it is 
rooted in a desire to apply the law in a fair and equal manner.95 
Currently, there is no formally recognized cultural defense in the 
American system of criminal justice.96 This absence, however, has not 
prevented defense attorneys from introducing cultural information 
about their clients under the context of preexisting defenses.97 Clearly, 
cultural information will be admitted into courtrooms whenever a case 
involves a cultural conflict; it is practically impossible to exclude it 
entirely.98 Therefore, the issue is not whether cultural evidence will be 
introduced, but whether such evidence can function to mitigate a 
defendant's charge and/or punishment. 
A. The Philosophical justification for Punishment in the Criminal Law 
In order to decide whether or not a defendant's culture should 
be considered in criminal cases, the various philosophical justifications 
for punishment must be examined.99 Generally, it is said that there are 
three principle theories of punishment: deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution. lOo The deterrence theory views punishment as the primary 
means of preventing the specific defendant and other potential defen-
dants from committing future crimes.lO l The central idea is that by 
penalizing criminal acts in a public way, the law prevents potential 
criminals, who fear that they too will be punished, from acting illegally, 
94 For a discussion of the value of multiculturalism, see The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 
1300-01. The author of the Note argues: "The cultural defense is integral to the United States' 
commitment to pluralism: it helps maintain a diversity of cultural identities by preserving impor-
tant ethnic values." Id. at 1301. The author further asserts that the United States should remain 
committed to cultural pluralism for several reasons. See id. First, cultural pluralism maintains a 
society's vigor. See id. at 1300. Second, the principle of equality underlying the American system 
of justice ultimately requires that the majority culture respects each minority culture's right to be 
different. See id. at 1301. Third, the level of cultural pluralism within our society measures, in 
part, the value the majority places on the concept of liberty. See id. Finally, cultural pluralism, 
and its positive relationship with liberty, may act as a bulwark against despotism. See id. 
95 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 439-40. 
96 See Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense, "17 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 57,57 (1994). 
97 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 437. Renteln explores the viability of incorporating cultural 
evidence into the framework of existing criminal defenses. See id. She examines the defenses of 
necessity, duress, self-defense, insanity, diminished capacity, automatism, provocation, mistake in 
fact, and religious defenses, and concludes that the existing affirmative defenses are inadequate, 
and that forcing immigrant defendants to use them in culture conflict cases results in "sophistic 
contortions and sometimes leads to injustice." Id. at 487. 
98 See id. at 439. 
99 See id. at 441. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. For an in-depth discussion of deterrence theory, see generally JOHANNES ANDENAES, 
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and thus, upholds the social order. 102 Advocates of the rehabilitation 
theory, on the other hand, believe that punishment reforms the char-
acter of the individual criminal and prevents him or her from commit-
ting crimes in the future. 103 According to this view, the process of being 
punished leads the criminal to the realization that what he or she did 
was wrong, and once this understanding has been reached, the indi-
vidual will not repeat his or her mistake in the future .104 Finally, follow-
ers of the retribution theory of punishment focus on the moral blame-
worthiness of a defendant, arguing that an individual should be punished 
only to the extent that he or she deserves. lOS The retribution view of 
punishment, also known as the doctrine of 'Just deserts," allows the 
community to express the extent of its disapproval by scaling the 
severity of punishment according to its moral outrage.106 
The debate about the relative primacy of these different justifica-
tions for punishment vis-a-vis the others is old and unresolved with 
respect to American criminal jurisprudence. Alison Dundes Renteln, 
a professor of political science at the University of Southern California, 
argues, however, that the fundamental basis for criminal punishment 
lies with retribution since deterrence and rehabilitation both implicitly 
rely on retribution in their justifications.107 She argues: 
Deterrence cannot stand alone, because general deterrence 
would be achieved by punishing the innocent. But deterrence 
is only valid if others are deterred by the punishment of one 
who is deserving of it. By like token, rehabilitation only suc-
ceeds if the prisoner accepts that he is blameworthy. Thus, the 
concept of just desert underlies the other theories of punish-
ment insofar as it is a tacit assumption for their legitimacy.lo8 
In other words, if there is no relationship between the punishment 
society imposes on the individual and the individual's degree of 
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 
(1971), cited in Renteln, supra note 11, at 441. 
102 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 441. 
103 See id. For an in-depth discussion of rehabilitation theory, see generally Francis A. Allen, 
Criminal justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE 
SCI. 226 (1959), cited in Renteln, supra note 11, at 441. 
104 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 441. 
105 See id. at 441-42. For an in-depth discussion of retribution theory, see generally Martin 
R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retrilnttion-An Examination of Doing justice, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 
781, cited in Renteln, supra note II, at 442. 
106 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 442. 
107 See id. 
108 Id. (emphasis added). 
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deservingness for the punishment, the law will not deter the ra-
tional individual from acting illegally since this individual realizes 
that the likelihood of receiving punishment is the same regardless 
of whether or not he or she actually breaks the law. 109 In this way, 
the deterrence theory of punishment functions only if those deserv-
ing of punishment are the ones actually punished, and as such, it 
presupposes the retribution theory of punishment. llo The same 
holds for the rehabilitation theory of punishment.lll Unless the 
criminal accepts that his or her action was wrong and that he or she 
is to blame personally for the wrong, the criminal will not be reformed, 
and there can be no rehabilitation. ll2 Therefore, the rehabilitation 
theory also assumes the retribution theory.113 
Central to the theory of retribution is the concept of proportion-
ality: the punishment should fit the crime.1l4 Proportionality takes 
many forms, the most well-known is probably the concept of "an eye 
for an eye" or the lex talionis. ll5 On the other hand, there is the more 
flexible scaling view of retribution called general proportionality.1l6 
Regardless of their specific view of proportionality, advocates of the 
retribution theory of punishment all agree on this general concept. ll7 
It is this aspect of retribution, proportional punishment, which pro-
vides the philosophical justification for a cultural defense: a defendant 
whose action is motivated by "good" reasons is less blameworthy in a 
moral sense, and less deserving of punishment, than a defendant who 
acts with "bad" motives. llS In order to see why this is so, one must 
examine the concepts of motive and intent.ll9 
B. Motive and Intent 
One of the immigrant defendant's primary motivations for at-
tempting to introduce evidence of his or her cultural background is 
to illustrate and emphasize the difference between legal and moral 
guilt. 120 Alison Dundes Renteln attributes the gray area separating these 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 442. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See Renteln, supra note 11. at 442. 
ll7 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. at 443. 
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two concepts to the confusion surrounding the distinction between 
motive and intent and the part these concepts play in creating le-
gal guilt.121 
With respect to criminal law, intent, or mens rea,122 is construed 
narrowly so that, as a requirement, it is satisfied if a defendant meant 
to behave in a way that has been deemed criminal.123 For example, if 
a defendant meant to exceed the speed limit on a freeway, he or she 
satisfied the intent requirement for a speeding violation. Therefore, in 
the eyes of the law, two people traveling ninety-five miles per hour on 
the same highway, one, a husband speeding to the hospital with his 
pregnant wife who is in labor, the other, a bank robber fleeing the 
scene of the crime, are both equally guilty of violating the law with 
respect to the speed limit. The two defendants' individual motivations 
for speeding are irrelevant; legally speaking, the only issue of impor-
tance is whether the defendants demonstrated the necessary intent to 
speed. Since both unquestionably intended to drive as fast as they were 
driving when the they were caught, they are both equally guilty in the 
legal sense. 
While a defendant's motive is not necessary to determine legal 
guilt, it is critical in establishing his or her moral guilt or blame-worthi-
ness for the violation.124 Returning to the example above, there is 
clearly a difference between these two defendants: while both the 
husband and the thief are equally guilty legally since they both in-
tended to speed, the husband is in some sense less guilty morally. More 
specifically, the husband's violation was motivated by his desire to get 
his wife and unborn child to the hospital so that the doctors could 
perform a safe delivery. The thiefs motivation for violating the speed-
ing law, on the other hand, was to evade capture by the authorities. 
Simply stated, the husband's motivation for breaking the speed limit 
was "good" in the moral sense; the thiefs motivation was "bad." In such 
a situation, it is difficult to deny that a defendant's relative culpability 
should depend on his or her motive in acting.125 
121 See id. 
122Translated to mean "guilty mind," mens rea is "an element of criminal responsibility" or 
"criminal intent." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990). 
123 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 443. 
124 See id. 
125 One of the reasons why the law may be hesitant to allow any official consideration of 
motive beyond discretionary consideration may stem from a desire to maintain deterrence: there 
may be a fear that if a defendant's motive was relevant, fact-finders would allow a defendant that 
was admittedly guilty of committing a crime to go free, and as a result, the effectiveness of the 
law to deter others from committing the crime would be decreased. See id. Another possible 
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Not surprisingly, the American criminal justice system recognizes 
that justice is not always served by completely ignoring the defendant's 
motive for acting. 126 In order to deal with these situations, the system 
grants its actors and officers a high level of discretion when it comes to 
evaluating a defendant's motivation, and thus his or her moral blame-
worthiness, for behaving in a criminal manner. 127 For example, extenu-
ating circumstances may be factored into a prosecutor's decision when 
charging a defendant with a crime or when plea bargaining with the 
defense attorney.128 Due to the considerable latitude given to judges in 
state sentencing statutes, the sentencing process also allows extenuat-
ing variables, such as culture, to be considered when fixing appropriate 
punishments for defendants in culture-conflict cases. 129 Cultural fac-
tors, in addition to influencing the discretionary decisions of prosecu-
tors and judges, may also influence ajury's decision. 130 For example, a 
jury, using its traditional power to nullifY a law that it considers unjust, 
can use cultural evidence to convict a defendant on lesser charges or 
to acquit the defendant completely.l3l The jury's ability to use cultural 
reason may be the fear that a defendant would be encouraged to manufacture fraudulent motives 
for his or her violations. See id. 
126 See id. at 444. 
127 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1295. 
128 See id. For example, when Kimura, a Japanese American living in California, learned of 
her husband's adultery, she attempted ayako-shinju, parent-child suicide, but only succeeded in 
killing her two children. See People v. Kimura, cited in Goldstein, supra note 13, at 147-49. 
Through a plea bargain between the prosecutor and her defense attorney, Kimura's homicide 
charge was reduced to voluntary manslaughter and she was sentenced to one year in prison, 
which she had already served, and five years probation with psychiatric counseling. See id. 
129 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1295. For example, Chen, a Chinese man living 
in New York, bludgeoned his wife to death after she confessed to having an affair with another 
man. See People v. Chen, cited in Renteln, supra note 11, at 480; Alexis Jetter, Fear is Legacy of 
Wife Killing in Chinatown; Battered Asians Shocked lTy Husband's Probation, NEWSDAY, CITY EDI-
TION, Nov. 26, 1989, at 4. An anthropologist from Hunter College testified that in Chinese culture, 
adulterous wives are sometimes severely punished by their husbands because a wife's infidelities 
reflect poorly not only on the husband, but also on the husband's ancestors and progeny. See 
Renteln, supra note 11, at 480. While some commentators have argued that under modern 
Chinese law, Chen would have been punished for murder, New York State Supreme Court Judge 
Edward Pincus, in a non jury trial, exercised considerable discretion and found Chen guilty of 
only second-degree manslaughter, fixing his sentence at a mere five years probation. See id. 
130 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1295 n.16. 
131 See id. For example, Croy, a Native American living in Yreka, California, an area known 
for its long-standing conflicts between the Anglo and Native American populations, was found 
guilty and sentenced to death for the killing of a police officer following a dispute over change 
at a liquor store. See People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985), cited in Renteln, supra note 11, at 
454-55. On appeal, Croy's attorney, Tony Serra, essentially argued for a culturally relative rea-
sonable person standard on the issue of self defense. See id. He defined this standard as "some-
thing of an 'individualized' objective standard of reasonableness which includes the individual's 
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evidence as a basis for nullification, however, depends on the trial 
judge's willingness to allow evidence of the defendant's cultural back-
ground in the first place.132 Since all consideration of motive is discre-
tionary, the importance of a specific defendant's cultural background 
is treated differently from case to case depending on the individuals 
making the discretionary decisions.133 Obviously, such a situation can 
lead to unequal application of the law and potentially gross injustices 
for the parties involved.134 Therefore, to the extent the law derives its 
legitimacy from morality, it should officially accommodate the distinc-
tion between legal and moral guilt and recognize cultural differences 
as mitigating factors which may decrease a particular defendant's moral 
blame-worthiness, and hence, his or her legal guilt. 135 
In order to understand why a defendant socialized in a different 
culture may be less morally blameworthy than a defendant socialized 
in the majority culture when both intentionally commit identical crimes, 
one must examine the influence that culture has on our behavior and 
moral beliefs. 
C. Culture and the Effects of Enculturation 
"Culture" is defined as the organized group of learned responses 
characteristic of a particular society.136 Anthropologists call the con-
scious and unconscious process by which all people learn the norms 
and values of their society enculturation. 137 Ralph Linton explains the 
profound manner in which an individual's culture shapes his or her 
world-view: 
perception of both apprehension and imminent danger from the individual's own perspective, 
but involves an objective view by the jurors of those circumstances." Id. While it is clear that none 
of the various Native American cultures within this country believe that homicide is justifiable, 
the jury was most likely persuaded by Serra's "cultural" argument since it acquitted Croy of all 
charges. See id. 
Id. 
132 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1295 n.16. 
133 See id. at 1297. 
134 See id. The author of the Note writes: 
Prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing, although important devices for 
dealing with cultural factors ... are by nature ad hoc, offering neither guarantees 
of procedural safeguards nor guidelines on the relevance of cultural factors. This 
absence of procedural safeguards and guidelines leads to inconsistency in the 
treattnent of cultural factors from case to case. 
135 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 443. 
136 See RALPH LINTON, THE TREE OF CULTURE 29 (8th prtg. 1972). 
137 See MELVILLE]. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS 39 (7th prtg. 1956). 
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No matter what the method by which the individual receives 
the elements of culture characteristic of his society, he is sure 
to internalize most of them. This process is called encultura-
tion. Even the most deliberately unconventional person is 
unable to escape his culture to any significant degree .... 
Cultural influences are so deep that even the behavior of the 
insane reflects them strongly. 138 
351 
While recognizing that individuals are capable of independent 
thought, feeling, and action, Linton writes that this independence is 
"limited" and "profoundly modified" by the culture in which the indi-
vidual develops.139 Therefore, culture shapes every person's perception of 
reality, and as a result, guides every person's behavior.140 
Given the influence that an individual's culture has on shaping 
his or her behavior, there are at least two situations where strict appli-
cation of our laws may be unjust for a person socialized in a foreign 
culture.141 First, such a defendant may have committed a criminal act 
because he or she was ignorant of the law in this country.142 This is 
known as the cognitive case: due to his or her cultural background and 
its conflicting values, the defendant simply did not realize his or her 
behavior was criminal.143 Although ignorance of the law has tradition-
ally been no excuse for violating it,144 the rationale for this legal maxim 
138LINTON, supra note 136, at 39. 
139 See id. at 29. 
140 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 445. Lucian Pye notes the durability and persistence 
of culture: 
It ... has this vital quality because it resides in the personality of everyone who has 
been socialized to it. People cling to their cultural ways not because of some vague 
feeling for their historical legacies and traditions, but because their culture is part 
and parcel of their personalities-and we know from psychoanalysis how hard ... 
it is to change personality. 
LUCIAN W. PYE, AsIAN POWER AND POLITICS: THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF AUTHORITY 20 
(1985). 
14l See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1299. 
142 See id. 
143 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 439. 
144 Opponents of the formalized cultural defense argue that ignorance of the law has never 
been an excuse for breaking it and that an immigrant has a duty to understand and heed the 
laws of his or her new culture. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 158. This view was espoused by 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1851 when he said: 
Every foreigner born residing in a country owes to that country allegiance and 
obedience so long as he remains in it, as a duty upon him by the mere fact of his 
residence, and that temporary protection which he enjoys, and is as much bound 
to obey its laws as native subjects or citizens. 
Id. at 145. 
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does not logically apply to people socialized in cultures other than our 
own. 145 For instance, the assumption behind the "ignorance of the law" 
maxim is that various socializing institutions-the family, schools, places 
of worship, etc.-can reasonably be expected to inform native people 
of the norms upon which their societies' laws are based.146 In other 
words, people socialized in our society need not know the exact word-
ing of the law in order to know generally, due to their contact with 
these socializing institutions, what the law expects of them. An immi-
grant to this country, however, has not been exposed to the same 
socializing institutions as a native, and therefore, he or she is more 
justified than a native in being ignorant of our criminallaws.147 For this 
reason, it may be unjust to apply this legal maxim to the defendant 
socialized in a foreign culture. 
A second situation which may result in an unjust result for the 
immigrant defendant has been termed the volitional case.148 It has 
been noted that a society's institutions not only make its members 
aware of its norms, the institutions also foster a sense of moral obligation 
to abide by these norms. 149 In other words, defendants raised in foreign 
cultures may feel morally obligated or compelled to abide by these 
norms in certain situations, despite their knowledge of the conflicting 
laws in their newly chosen society.150 Thus, in certain situations the 
power of enculturation is so persuasive that mere awareness by the 
defendant that a given behavior is criminal may not be sufficient to 
prevent its acting out, especially if the behavior is part of a fundamental 
cultural value. l5l Once norms have acquired this moral dimension, 
conformity with the conflicting laws of the majority culture often be-
comes very difficult. 152 Therefore, because a defendant may be unable 
145 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1299. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 1300. 
149 See id. 
150 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1300. 
151 See id. For example, while ayako-shinju, or parent<hild suicide, is illegal inJapan, this type 
of behavior is viewed by many within the defendant's native culture as an acceptable thing to do 
in an unacceptable social situation. See People v. Kimura, cited in Goldstein, supra note 13, at 
147-49; Spencer Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 1. In defending 
a client accused of killing her children in accordance with ayako-shinju, Gerald Klausner noted 
that "perhaps [his client] regressed back to earlier instincts" that she learned in Japan which 
made her "see her children as an extension of herself," and thus, sharing in her disgrace and 
shame. See id. Unlike American women, Klausner argued that a woman socialized according to 
Japanese values would not conceive of leaving her children alone to face the humiliation caused 
by their father's adultery after she was gone. See id. 
152 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1300. 
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to keep himself or herself from violating the law of this country if it 
conflicts with one of his or her fundamental cultural values which has 
acquired moral stature, it may be unjust to apply strict American law 
in culture conflict cases. 153 
The degree to which a defendant's actions will be excused or 
condemned depends on the degree to which it is comprehensible to 
the finder of fact. 154 If culture shapes a person's perception of reality 
and guides his or her behavior, in order for the judge or jury to 
understand what motivates the actions of a defendant, it must, by 
definition, consider the defendant's culture. Judge Gomes of Fresno, 
California, who has heard several cultural defense arguments in plea 
bargains between prosecutors and defense attorneys representing their 
Hmong clients in his court, believes that he would have difficulty 
excluding any evidence, cultural or otherwise, which could help him 
understand the defendant's actions. 155 He stated: "I don't think ajudge 
can ever get enough information when he is sentencing someone. I 
am surprised there are judges around who won't allow cultural de-
fenses at least at the time of sentencing. It appears to me to be 
extremely relevan t. "156 
Critics of the formalized cultural defense are not as accepting as 
Judge Gomes and worry, not about the abstract definition of the 
cultural defense, but rather about the more practical issues of who may 
and may not assert the defense. Critics pose a number of troubling 
questions for advocates of the defense. 157 For example, how does one 
define a distinctly "foreign culture" for the purposes of the defense?158 
Would a formally recognized cultural defense be limited to individuals 
who actually immigrated to this country from a foreign land, or could 
individuals born and raised in the United States, but socialized accord-
ing to the norms and values of a "subculture" within this country, also 
153 See id. 
154 See Renteln, supra note 11, at 445. 
155 See Myrna Oliver, Immigrant Crimes; Cultural Defense-A Legal Tactic, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 
1988, at l. 
156Id. For example, Judge Gomes allowed a Guatemalan to plead his charge down from 
murder to manslaughter after the defendant slit the throat of a friend who had been severely 
beaten by five men. See id. Judge Gomes said: 
Id. 
It was a heinous crime but not a heinous motive. As a guerrilla fighter, [the 
defendant] thought the guy was dying and that he was giving him a painless death. 
If I had not heard that, I might very well have sentenced this man for an act 
motivated by our very different set of values. 
157 See generally Goldstein, supra note 13. 
158 See id. at 158-59. 
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assert it?159 Another problematic issue is that of assimilation.16o For 
instance, if the cultural assimilation of immigrants is possible, how long 
does this process take?161 If, on the other hand, assimilation of immi-
grants is not possible, will the children and grandchildren of these 
immigrants also be able to assert a cultural defense if they are raised 
according to their family's culture?162 Many view these practical pro1:r 
lems inherent in the definition of the defense as a "slippery slope" and 
"perhaps the most severe detriment toward a recognition of a cultural 
defense. "163 
While there is no doubt that these questions raise concerns about 
the scope of the cultural defense when applied in practice, several 
factors have been proposed which, when considered by courts on a 
case-by-case basis, will enable judges to determine when and to what 
extent the cultural defense should apply to a particular defendant. l64 
These factors are the possibility of recurrence, the severity of the crime, 
whether the crime is victimless, whether the crime is confined to 
voluntary participants within the defendant's culture, whether serious 
bodily or emotional harm was inflicted on the victim, the degree of 
identifiability of the culture, the degree of self-containment, the size 
of the cultural group, the degree of the defendant's assimilation into 
the majority culture, and the importance of the cultural value that 
motivated the criminal act.165 By considering and balancing these fac-
tors in each case, courts will be able to control the scope of the cultural 
defense and allow its use in only appropriate situations.166 
In sum, if the fundamental philosophical justification for punish-
ment underlying criminal jurisprudence as a whole is the retribution 
theory, and if the concept of enculturation is as powerful as anthro-
pologists believe in determining and shaping an individual's actions, 
159 Robert T. Perry and Carlton Long argue that an individual born and raised in the United 
States, but socialized according to the norms and values of a subculture distinct from the "majority 
culture," should be able to assert a cultural defense. See Robert T. Perry & Carlton Long, Obscenity 
Law, Hip Hap Music and 2 Live Crew, N.Y.LJ.,July 13, 1990, at 5. Perry and Long have argued 
that the Mrican-American rap group "2 Live Crew" "reflects a [distinct] culture speaking out 
against the long, painful, and immediate backdrop of the 'Reagan Revolution.'" Id.; see al5oPeople 
v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985), cited in Renteln, supra note 11, at 454-55 (Native American 
successfully asserts a culture-based defense for murder). 
160 See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 160. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163Id. 
164 See The Cultural Defense, supra note 8, at 1308-1I. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
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then the criminal law must be flexible enough to incorporate explana-
tions of behavior based on cultural considerations when trying defen-
dants in criminal culture-conflict cases. The American criminal justice 
system should formally recognize the cultural defense and allow its use 
in appropriate situations. 
III. THE CULTURAL DEFENSE APPLIED TO CHILD PROTECTION LAw 
While an affirmative cultural defense is completely consistent with 
a system of law where punishment is based on retribution, how should 
it apply in an area of law, such as child protection law, where punish-
ment is expressly and intentionally rehabilitative in nature? The follow-
ing section explores this question and concludes that, due to the 
uniquely rehabilitative nature of punishment within child protection 
law, the cultural defense is irrelevant in most cases of child abuse and 
neglect. 167 
A. The Rehabilitative Nature of Child Protection Law 
The overriding goal of child protection law is threefold: one, to 
identify and protect the children who are or may be at risk; two, to 
assess the individual needs of the children and the families involved; 
and three, to institute an intervention plan which will best resolve these 
needs and prevent future harm to the children. 168 Modern child abuse 
and neglect statutes also have three primary purposes: one, to define 
child abuse and neglect and to identify children at risk; two, to recog-
nize a specific agency to receive and investigate reported incidents of 
abuse and neglect; and three, to offer appropriate services and pro-
grams for abused and neglected children and their families. 169 While 
each state has adopted its own unique child protection statute and 
167 Since severe cases of child abuse may result in incarceration. there may be instances where 
a defendant should be able to assert a cultural defense for his or her actions in a child abuse 
case. See id. However, because the vast majority of child abuse cases result in state enforced 
rehabilitation, the cultural defense is, for the most part, irrelevant in child protection law as it 
currently stands. See id. 
168 See Sanford N. Katz, Cases and Materials on Child Protection Law ch. 3, 1 (1996) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Katz Unpublished ch. 3]. 
169 See id. at 12. Modern child abuse and neglect statutes are commonly known as "reporting 
statutes" since they require certain individuals, based on their occupational contact with children, 
to report instances of abuse or neglect when they come into contact with it. See id. at 12, 18. A 
few examples of mandated reporters are physicians; hospital personnel engaged in the examina-
tion, care, or treatment of patients; public and private teachers; psychologists and psychiatrists; 
police officers; firefighters; social workers; and day care workers. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, 
§ 51A (Law. Co-op. 1995). The Massachusetts statute has over 30 specified mandatory reporters. 
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child protection philosophy, one common theme connects them all: 
child abuse and neglect is perceived to be a social problem that is best 
handled by the rehabilitative efforts of social workers. I70 In other words, 
the prosecution of abusive or neglectful adults is not considered a 
primary goal of child protection law.I7l 
There are generally seven steps that state authorities follow once 
a report of suspected abuse or neglect is filed in accordance with the 
particular reporting statute.172 The first step, called intake, is where a 
caseworker screens reports of alleged child abuse or neglect filed with 
the child protection agency for their validity and urgency.I73 Mter a 
particular case is verified, the caseworker makes a thorough investiga-
tion of the alleged maltreatment.174 During this investigation stage, the 
caseworker determines if the child is being harmed or threatened in 
his or her family environment, if removal is necessary to ensure the 
child's safety, and if ongoing services will be necessary to end the 
maltreatment.175 Following this investigation, the caseworker makes a 
family assessment: he or she uses the information gathered during the 
investigation to identify the reasons for, and the extent of, the maltreat-
ment.176 The child protection worker then formulates a case plan for 
the family which establishes specific enumerated goals to be achieved 
and services to be provided. 177 Mter the case plan has been agreed to 
by all of the relevant parties,I7S the caseworker is responsible for arrang-
ing the delivery of services which will assist the family in the realization 
of their case plan. I79 Some of the more common services arranged by 
the caseworker at this stage are financial assistance, day care, crisis 
nurseries, homemaker care, parenting classes, and counseling serv-
ices. Iso As the family members begin receiving services and start to 
See id. It also authorizes "any other person to make such a report if any such person has reasonable 
cause to believe that a child is suffering from or has died as a result of such abuse or neglect" Id. 
170 See id. 
171 See Monrad Paulsen, The Law and Afntsed Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 175, 176 (R. 
Helfer & C. Kempe eds., 1968). 
172 See Katz Unpublished ch. 3, supra note 168, at 5. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 5-6. 
176 See id. at 6. 
177 See Katz Unpublished ch. 3, supra note 168, at 6. This case plan is often presented to the 
court as proposed treatment in cases requiring judicial intervention. See id. at 7. 
178 If the parties refuse to agree to the case plan, a judge may impose it on them through a 
court order. See id. at 8. 
179 See id. at 7. 
180 See Besharov, supra note 29, at 316. 
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modify their behaviors, the caseworker must evaluate the family's pro-
gress, determining if the case plan goals are being accomplished. 181 
The final stage is called case closure.182 At this point the caseworker 
decides whether the causes of the abuse or neglect have been sig-
nificantly reduced or eliminated.183 If they have, the case is closed.184 If 
they have not, and no future progress is likely, the child protection 
agency may seek termination of the parental rights. 18s 
Except in severe cases, child protection agencies rarely consider 
criminal prosecution of abusive or neglectful parents to be an appro-
priate response for maltreatment. 186 This aversion to prosecution is 
partially rooted in a fear that such action will hinder efforts at treating 
the offender and salvaging the family unit. 187 This fear is based on the 
belief that, generally speaking, child abuse and neglect is not the result 
of a conscious intention by the parent to injure his or her child; rather 
it is seen as the result of the parent's inability to nurture his or her 
offspring. 188 Sanford Katz describes one of the central premises of the 
child protection philosophy: 
Inadequate parenting and child abuse and neglect are in-
fluenced by personal and social factors. Most often they are 
manifestations of despair and failure rather than willful, pre-
meditated behaviors. Regardless of life experiences, [social 
workers and experts on child abuse and neglect believe that] 
most people have the capacity to change if given the appro-
priate opportunities.189 
Moreover, child protection scholars argue that a policy which pro-
motes the prosecution of abusive or neglectful parents would be 
lSI See Katz Unpublished ch. 3, supra note 168, at 8. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
186 See Besharov, supra note 29, at 317-18. 
187 See id. at 318. Besharov, on the other hand, argues that the criminal justice system should 
playa larger role in child abuse and neglect cases. See generally id. In support of this position, he 
cites statistics in New York indicating that fewer than five percent of substantiated reports result 
in criminal prosecution, that twenty-five percent of all fatalities attributed to child abuse involve 
children already known to be at risk by child protection authorities, and that twenty-five percent 
of known child abusers offend again. See id. at 319, 320. Based on these types of statistics, he 
concludes that child protection law has become "decriminalized" and that a new philosophy 
which emphasizes greater prosecution of offenders is necessary. See id. at 315. 
188 See Freiman, supra note 1, at 246. 
189 Katz Unpublished ch. 3, supra note 168, at 2. 
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ineffective in combating the problem of child maltreatment since 
the criminal justice courts have only limited access to support and 
treatment services for the troubled parents.190 Monrad Paulsen writes: 
[C]riminal sanctions are a poor means of preventing child 
abuse. Day-to-day family life, charged with the most intimate 
emotions, is not likely to be an area of life easily ruled by the 
threat of fines or imprisonment. A criminal proceeding may 
punish an offender who deserves punishment, but it may also 
divide rather than unite a family. The criminal law can destroy 
a child's family relationship; it cannot preserve or rebuild it. 
The most severe cases of child abuse may call for prosecution, 
but the prosecutors often are not able to arrange for the care 
a child needs. 191 
Brian G. Fraser comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that even 
if convicted, offenders are usually incarcerated for a relatively short 
period of time. 192 Moreover, since the offender has not learned any 
new strategies for coping with stress or for disciplining his or her 
children without violence, when released back into the home environ-
ment there is nothing besides the threat of incarceration to stop him 
or her from repeating the harmful behavior. 193 Fraser writes: "[Once 
released, t]he conditions which precipitated the initial abuse will still 
be present and may give rise to further instances of abuse. "194 A further 
reason child protection agencies resist arguments in favor of the prose-
cution of abusive and neglectful parents is that they believe criminali-
zation would discourage offenders from seeking medical attention for 
their injured children due to the increased possibility of being caught 
and punished.195 If such a policy was to be adopted, child protection 
experts argue, its effect would be the further victimization of abused 
and neglected children. 196 Finally, child protection agencies argue that 
their policy of not prosecuting perpetrators encourages parents who 
recognize their abusive or neglectful tendencies to seek help on their 
own without fear of adverse legal consequences. 197 It is argued that if 
190 See Besharov, supra note 29, at 318. 
191 Paulsen, supra note 171, at 176. 
192 See Brian G. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, 
12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 103, 121 (1974). 
193 See id. 
194Id. 
195 See Besharov, supra note 29, at 318. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. Many parents, it turns out, do call various state agencies when they feel like they 
have lost control and may actually injure their children. See id. 
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these parents decide against seeking voluntary treatment due to the 
likelihood of prosecution, the abuse and neglect suffered by the chil-
dren may not be discovered until it is too late. 198 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the theory of pun-
ishment underlying the various states' child protection statutes is not 
punishment-based deterrence or retribution, but rather, educational 
rehabilitation. The scholarly writings in the area of child abuse and 
neglect consistently speak in terms of reeducating and helping abusive 
and neglectful parents to become nurturing caregivers. 199 When child 
welfare agents verifY instances of maltreatment, state action does not 
come in the form of police reports and the incarceration of abusive or 
neglectful parents; rather, "effective intervention," it is believed, "re-
quires that the child protection services enter relationships with [the 
abusive or neglectful parents] non-punitively, non-critically, and with 
an offer of help."20o The following case illustrates the extent of child 
protection law's express and intentional rehabilitative philosophy, and 
thus, the irrelevancy of the cultural defense in this unique area of law. 
B. A Representative Case: Dumpson v. Daniel M.201 
The defendant in Dumpson v. Daniel M.202was a thirty-four year-old 
Nigerian taxi driver who attended Brooklyn College where he was 
198 See id. 
199 See Fraser, supra note 192, at 121; Paulsen, supra note 171, at 176. 
200 Katz Unpublished ch. 3, supra note 168, at 3. 
201 Dumpson, supra note 15, at 69. 
202Id. While my research indicates that there are no reported child abuse cases where the 
defendant asserted a cultural defense in any of the standard reporters, several newspaper articles 
suggest that there are unreported cases of this kind in existence. For example, in Houston a 
Nigerian immigrant was charged with child abuse for striking his misbehaving nephew with an 
electrical cord and then putting pepper in the boy's bleeding abrasions. See Texas News Briefs, 
UPI, Apr. 8,1987, available in LEXIS, REGNW Library, TXNWS File. The defendant argued that 
this type of discipline was common in Nigeria and the court "punished" him with probation. See 
Oliver, supra note 155, at 1. The parents in a Vietnamese family near Los Angeles were charged 
with child abuse after suspicious injuries were reported on their child's back and shoulders. See 
id. The charges were dropped, however, when a friend explained to authorities that the markings 
were the result of cao gio, or "coining," a cultural folk remedy believed to cure headaches through 
the massaging of the child's back and shoulders with the edge of a serrated coin. See id. In Los 
Angeles, a mother born and raised in Mexico was charged with child abuse, and temporarily lost 
the custody of her children, when she beat her 15 year-old son with a wooden spoon and bit him 
for taking money from her purse without permission. See id. She argued that her behavior is 
considered acceptable punishment in Mexico, and as a result, she avoided any serious sanctions 
besides being ordered to get counseling. See id. And finally, in San Francisco and Los Angeles, 
two Japanese mothers killed their children when they learned of their husbands' infidelities. See 
id. However, the mothers' charges were reduced from murder to manslaughter after experts 
testified that ayako-shinju, or parent-child suicide, is a practice not uncommon in the women's 
native culture when a wife is presented with her husband's extramarital affairs. See id. 
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studying to become an engineer.203 He had been living in the United 
States for six years when the charges were filed. 204 The defendant was 
married to a thirty-five year-old New York City public high school 
biology and chemistry teacher who was the biological mother of two 
of the four children living with the couple. The remaining two children 
were from the defendant's first marriage in Mrica.205 The child at issue 
in this case, Ekenediliz, was born to the defendant during his first 
marriage. 206 
The state charged the defendant with the infliction of exces-
sive corporal punishment on his son Ekenediliz and based its allega-
tions on two separate incidents.207 The first incident occurred after the 
defendant received nine letters from his son's teacher complaining of 
Ekenediliz's behavior in school.208 In response to the letters, the defen-
dant requested a meeting with the boy's teacher to discuss the matter, 
but since the teacher was unavailable, the defendant and his son met 
with the assistant principal.209 During the meeting the assistant princi-
pal spoke of the difficulties that the defendant's son was causing for 
his teacher in the c1assroom.210 Then, without warning, the defendant 
stood up and began to hit the boy repeatedly with his fists and his belt, 
and when Ekenediliz fell to the floor, the defendant kicked him with 
his feet.211 The assistant principal attempted to restrain the defendant 
and he responded to this interference by striking her too. Mter the 
defendant regained his composure, he apologized to the assistant 
principal. 212 
The defendant asserted a cultural defense for his actions, testifY-
ing that according to his culture, this type of punishment was both 
necessary and appropriate.213 The defendant explained that in Nigeria, 
when a boy misbehaves in school, he brings shame on the family and 
203 See Dumpson, supra note 15, at 69. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. On August 18, 1974, a preliminary hearing resulted in an order directing the 
temporary removal of Ekenediliz and two of his siblings from the defendant's home pending a 
further investigation on the matter. See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See Dumpson, supra note 15, at 69. The date of this incident was March 7, 1974. See id. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
2ll See id. 
212 See id. In his testimony, the defendant admitted to hitting his son with his hands and his 
belt, but denied kicking him or striking the assistant principal. See id. 
213 See Dumpson, supra note 15, at 69. 
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that his parents have a duty to punish him immediately and in any 
manner that they see fit. 214 When directly questioned by the court, the 
defendant testified that in his judgment, the punishment he inflicted 
on Ekenediliz was appropriate in order to stop any more negative 
school reports.215 On cross-examination, however, the defendant admit-
ted that it was not only his son's classroom behavior that provoked him. 
He testified that he was also angered by his son's lack of respect for 
the assistant principal, explaining that "Ekenediliz was looking at [her] 
face while we were talking."216 
The second incident of abuse217 concerned some bruises and welts 
on Ekenediliz's body.218 When questioned on the source of these inju-
ries, the defendant testified that his son told him that several boys had 
beaten him up on the way home from school,219 According to the 
defendant, he accompanied his son to school the next day, to both pro-
tect him and to confront the attackers, but unfortunately, Ekenediliz 
was unable to identify the boys for his father.22o 
When the defendant's wife testified, she said that her husband had 
punished Ekenediliz on the day of this second incident but that his 
actions had not caused the bruises or welts at issue.221 While the defen-
dant's wife admitted that her husband struck the children when they 
did something wrong, she adamantly maintained that he was a good 
father and that she never witnessed him beating them.222 She justified 
his method of discipline in cultural terms: it was the way he was raised 
in Nigeria.223 
The court determined that the "sole issue" before it was "whether 
the [defendant's] conduct constitutes excessive corporal punishment" 
under the statutory definition of the term.224 Mter taking note of 
society's high level of racial and ethnic diversity and the court's "obli-
gation to apply the law equally to all men" as it simultaneously "recog-
niz[es the] individual and cultural differences [between citizens]," the 
214 See id. 
215 See id. at 70. 
216 See id. 
217This incident occurred on June 4,1974. See id. 
218 See Dumpson, supra note 15, at 70. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See Dumpson, supra note 15, at 70. 
224 See id. at 71. 
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court concluded that the defendant was guilty of inflicting excessive 
corporal punishment on the boy.225 The court wrote: 
In a society as culturally amorphous as our own, it is incum-
bent upon all members of society to be tolerant and under-
standing of customs that differ from their own . . . . While 
the commonly accepted definition of corporal punishment 
means some type of applied bodily force, there is no doubt 
that pummeling with the fists, striking with a belt, and kicking 
with the feet, satisfy the elements of even the most conserva-
tive definition of corporal punishment.226 
In determining the defendant's guilt, the court wrote: 
Any reasonable man knows that it is not in the best interests 
of a child for its parents to punish in the manner we have 
seen here. While we are sympathetic and understanding of 
the defendant's motives, we must conclude that motive is 
irrelevant when we are confronted with the type of punish-
ment this seven-year-old boy has received.227 
Thus, while the court expressed both sympathy and understanding 
of the defendant's cultural motivations for acting as he did, the 
decision expressly stated that motive and therefore culture, is irrele-
vant in cases of violent child abuse.228 
In determining the proper sanction for the defendant, the court 
decided that despite the savage and public nature of the beating, the 
defendant was not "a mean, vindictive or disturbed parent," but rather 
"a man who honestly believes that he is acting in the best interests of 
his children. "229 Emphasizing the rehabilitative nature of its child abuse 
and neglect statute, the court noted further that the New York law was 
"not a device for recrimination against parents who use unorthodox 
child-rearing practices," and that 
[a] finding of neglect in this matter is not meant to cast any 
negative overtones on the respondent's ability to function as 
a parent in any other respect. Rather, it is to enable the court 
to get the [defendant's] family the type of assistance they 
225 See id. 
226Id. 
227Id. (emphasis added). 
228 See Dumpson, supra note 15, at 71. 
229 See id. 
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need so that the [defendant] and his children may be re-
united. 230 
363 
Thus, the court expressly held that the purpose of child protection 
legislation is not to "cast any negative overtones" on the general 
parenting abilities of a recognized abusive parent or caregiver.231 
Rather it should act as a vehicle by which the state can provide the 
assistance necessary to preserve families at risk.232 Consistent with 
the writings of Paulsen and Fraser,233 the court concluded that in-
carceration was not an appropriate sanction for the defendant's 
violent behavior.234 Instead, the court believed that the defendant's 
actions demonstrated the need for rehabilitative counseling and 
that it was the court's "duty and responsibility" to provide the de-
fendant and his family with "some form of treatment" to prevent 
future abuse and neglect from occurring.235 The facts and holding 
of this case clearly demonstrate that the theory of punishment 
underlying child protection law is rehabilitation through educa-
tion, not retribution-based sanctions. As a result, the fundamental 
justification for the adoption of a formal cultural defense is non-ex-
istent in the area of child protection law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has demonstrated the difficulty inherent in defining 
child abuse and neglect in the academic arena, in statutory language, 
and across cultural lines. The lack of definitional uniformity between 
states and cultures increases the potential for disputes concerning the 
"correct" definition of child abuse and neglect, especially in cases 
where the particular defendant was socialized in a foreign culture with 
different values and child-rearing practices. This lack of uniformity 
gives rise to the central question posed in this Note: should a person 
accused of child abuse and neglect in this country be allowed to argue 
that since his or her actions are condoned in the culture in which the 
accused was raised, he or she is less morally culpable than a native 
offender, and thus, the charge or punishment should be mitigated? 
230Id. at 72. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. 
233 See Paulsen. supra note 171, at 176; see also Fraser, supra note 192, at 121. 
234 See Dumpson, supra note 15, at 72. 
235 See id. 
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This Note advocates the formal recognition of the cultural defense 
in the general American criminal justice system for two interdependent 
reasons: one, the philosophical justification of punishment and two, 
the overwhelming influence that an individual's culture has on his or 
her actions. This Note has argued that the deterrence and the reha-
bilitative theories of punishment both presuppose aspects of the retri-
bution theory, the fundamental philosophical justification for punish-
ment within the American criminal justice system. Central to the 
theory of retribution is the idea that a person's punishment should fit 
the crime committed. Therefore, in determining the proper punish-
ment for a given individual, this Note has argued that an inquiry into 
a defendant's motivations for acting illegally is required, as is a moral 
judgment on these particular motives. In this way, a person who acts 
with "good" motives should be punished less severely than a person 
who commits exactly the same illegal act, but does so with "bad" motives. 
This issue of motivation is crucial in culture-conflict cases given 
the profound ways in which an individual's culture shapes his or her 
perception of reality, and as a result, his or her behavior. Through the 
process of enculturation, cultural practices become part of the individ-
ual's personality, at times actually compelling the individual to act ille-
gally despite knowledge of the law and the consequences of breaking 
it. This Note has argued that since a defendant's culture may act as a 
powerful motivating force in and of itself, the legal system must consider 
the defendant's culture when determining the defendant's guilt and 
punishment, and thus, should formally recognize the cultural defense. 
Unlike the general criminal law, the guiding principle in child 
protection law is expressly and intentionally rehabilitation, not retribu-
tion. As Dumpson demonstrates, the crucial issue in child protection 
law is not why the parent abused or neglected the child. The Dumpson 
decision clearly holds that motive is irrelevant in cases of this kind. 
Rather, the crucial question for courts applying child protection law is 
whether the parent did hit the child. If the answer is shown to be "no," 
the case is dismissed. If the answer is shown to be "yes," the abusive or 
neglectful person is not incarcerated or sanctioned personally; rather 
he or she is ordered to participate in various programs designed to 
teach the parent how to be a nurturing caregiver. Simply stated, offend-
ers are not punished, they are rehabilitated. Because the justification 
for the cultural defense relies on the retribution theory of punishment 
and the emphasis it places on a person's motivation when determining 
his or her appropriate punishment, the cultural defense, in the unique 
area of child protection law, is effectively rendered irrelevant. 
